

SECRET

Summary of my meeting with President Dorticos, Premier Castro and Foreign Minister Roa in Havana, October 30, 1962.

Also Present: Ambassador Omar Loutfi, Dr. Tavares de Sa,
Major General Rikhye

- - - - -

I asked Premier Castro whether the presence of General Rikhye at the meeting was acceptable, and no objections were raised. I thanked Premier Castro and his Government for their invitation to me and expressed my assurance that the conversations which would be held today and tomorrow would be most fruitful and would be a great contribution to finding a solution to the current explosive problem. Premier Castro assured me that he was ready to hold conversations with me at anytime and for any length of time that I would find necessary.

I summarised the events that brought me there, making special mention that this was originally a request made by the 45 non-aligned nations which were also present at the conferences of Bandoeng and Belgrade. Also the appeals made to the three powers: Chairman Khrushchev to suspend the shipments of arms to Cuba, President Kennedy to suspend the blockade of Cuba, and to Premier Castro to suspend the construction of missile sites for two or three weeks for the time necessary to negotiate. There was a second appeal to Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy to avoid direct confrontation as news reached me that Soviet ships were nearing the blockade line. That same day I wrote to Premier

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ST/A1/326/28-12-84
By M8G, UNARCH, Date 2-12-87

Castro, accepting the invitation to come to Cuba. Since then there had been a number of communications between the powers involved, the substance of which is common knowledge. The problem as seen by me had two parts; an immediate problem and a long-term one. The purpose of the present negotiations was concerned with the former. Several factors were involved. Chairman Khrushchev had instructed his ships to stay away from the blockade line, and President Kennedy had replied that the United States was prepared to avoid direct confrontation if no arms were being carried on these ships. The two powers had agreed on the following: for two to three weeks no arms would be shipped to Cuba by the Soviet Union, and the United States, for the same period, would not impose its quarantine. However, the United States wanted to be certain that there would be no arms shipped into Cuba, and wanted a U.N. machinery to be set up for this purpose for the two or three weeks in question. This was not acceptable to the Soviet Union, which yesterday countered by saying that it would agree to verification by the Red Cross.

The Red Cross, on being consulted at Geneva over the phone, agreed to do this, either on the high sea or at the port of landing, but only if the Cuban Government found the latter solution agreeable.

I re-stated that I was not partial to one or the other solution, but that I wished to assure the Cuban Government that the Red Cross involvement accepted by the Soviet Union and the United States would only be practicable if all due regard was given to the sovereignty of Cuba. This I had stated to the three powers concerned. Then I came to my first point that it would help my

work to know the attitude of the Cuban Government towards the idea of a Red Cross verification for a period of two to three weeks.

I was then told by Premier Castro that he would rather hear all my points first and then reply to them one by one.

I then went on to say that the United States Government had expressed a greater concern over the construction of launching pads rather than over shipments of arms to Cuba. These launching pads, in fact, were their main concern. As was known from public statements, Chairman Khrushchev replied on Sunday that he had instructed Soviet technicians to dismantle all missiles and ship them back to the Soviet Union. Chairman Khrushchev did not object to the U.N. being asked to send an observation team to certify such dismantling. I stated that I had replied to the Soviet Union, that before such a U.N. team could be sent, the most important point had to be settled; namely that the Cuban Government must give its prior consent. No action could be taken that would infringe on the sovereignty of the Cuban people and its Government. There was one area of agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, and that was if the pads were dismantled, tensions would be greatly eased. Through me, I said, the United States wanted to reach an interim arrangement to last while the dismantling was underway. Moscow was asked yesterday for an estimate of how long this would take, but no reply had as yet been received. The United States wanted this interim arrangement to be verified by the U.N., but as always subject to the Cuban Government's acceptance. I appealed to Premier Castro to give his agreement.

It was not possible to know exactly how long the dismantling would take. Perhaps one or two weeks or even more. If Cuba agreed, then I suggested a U.N. observer team made up of persons acceptable to the Cuban Government. The second alternative was that the dismantling be verified by a U.N. aerial reconnaissance plane, manned by a crew of acceptable nationals. Perhaps even with the participation of a representative each of the three powers involved, on board. The United States Government had stated that as soon as such a plan was implemented, it would make a public declaration, and also a statement at the Security Council, if necessary, to the effect that they would not undertake aggression against Cuba and that they would guarantee Cuba's territorial integrity. Yesterday, I asked the United States to lift the blockade for the time I would need to appeal to Cuba, and while I was down there for negotiations. This, as was made public that morning, was granted by the United States for 48 hours. As premier Castro knew, and as had been said in the Security Council, a blockade is a very unusual action except in times of war. The 45 non-aligned countries shared this view and the U.A.R. and Ghana said so in the Security Council.

The immediate problem today was the U.N. verification. The Security Council had not authorised me to negotiate on long-term problems. These must be taken up at a later date by the powers involved.

Premier Castro asked whether I considered that the request of dismantling the launching pads in Cuba was based on right or on a position of force. I answered that in my view, it was not

based on right, but on apprehension. Castro said he saw no reason for this request as Cuba always acted in strict conformity with international law and committed no aggression against anybody, while it was victim first of a blockade, which is an illegal act, and, secondly, of the pretense by a foreign power to determine what Cuba had or had not the right to do within its national borders, while Cuba was a state as sovereign as any other with all attributes sovereignty implies. On the other hand, the United States frequently violated international law - Cuban airspace - and was instrumental in aggression against Cuba. To pretend to justify this by an agreement with the O.A.S. had no value for Cuba, the more so as Cuba had been expelled from the O.A.S.

Premier Castro stressed that, while Cuba would accept anything within the limits of international law, that would imply no maiming of its sovereign rights, it would not accept any imposition by force. Inspection was intended to humiliate the Cuban State and it would not accept it. This was Cuba's permanent position, included in the statement made by the Cuban Government against joint resolution of the United States Government. Premier Castro quoted a page from that statement to the effect that his government bought arms to defend their country and that they would never cede their sovereign rights to a foreign country; the same view being expressed by President Dorticos in the U.N. and in many public statements of Premier Castro. Cuba took measures to defend its security against a systematic policy of hostility and aggression and would firmly abide by its decision to defend its

sovereign right.

Premier Castro stressed that Cuba was ready to negotiate with sincerity, provided its honour was respected, which would not be the case if negotiations would infringe on its sovereign rights. To uphold its sovereign rights Cuba was ready to pay any price, and these were no mere words.

I expressed my appreciation of the feelings of Premier Castro. I explained that was why I made it clear to the United States and other countries that any U.N. action on Cuban territory could only be undertaken with the consent of the people and the Government of Cuba. For this, and for peace, which all the world wants, I had told the 45 non-aligned countries that I could only agree to come to Cuba if free of all prior commitments. Some press reports of last night and that morning said that I was in Cuba to arrange for the presence of a U.N. team there. This was entirely wrong, and would constitute an infringement of Cuban sovereignty. I said I had come to Cuba to present the point of view of the other sides on the problem and explore the possibilities for finding a peaceful solution, and also the points of view of the 45 countries, all of which knew what was legal and what was not. But they had asked me to come here for the sake of world peace and perhaps to find a solution for an interim period of one or two weeks. I told Premier Castro that my conscience on this matter was clear. U.N. action could be undertaken in territories of a member state only with the consent of the government concerned.

I then went on to quote the cases of Laos, Egypt and Lebanon, where situations had developed that greatly endangered world peace and where the U.N. presence was established only at the request of their respective governments. In the case of Egypt, even now the U.N. was there, but with the consent of its Government.

Premier Castro added the Congo to the list, while mentioning that the Government that made the request existed no longer, to which I replied that the present Government which accepted the U.N. presence was recognised by the majority of member states.

Premier Castro stressed that the Cuban Government had great esteem for me personally and my noble mission, and never doubted either my good faith or my desire to find just and equitable solutions. Yet, he pointed out that, while the interest of everybody was to have peace, the road to it was not one of sacrificing the legitimate rights of the people and violating them, this way leads to war. The way to peace was the guarantee and observance of legitimate rights and the resistance of the peoples against such violations. He pointed out that all the cases mentioned, Laos, UAR, Lebanon and Congo proceeded from the same origin, to wit, aggression against legitimate rights of the peoples. The way that led to world war two was the Anschluss of Austria and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia from which German imperialism was not being resisted. Cuba fully knows the ways of aggressors and guesses the ways the United States wishes to follow against Cuba. Hence, it could

understand how one might speak of immediate solutions separately from future perspectives. Cuba's interest was not to buy peace now at any price, but to have it secured forever, and not to pay daily for short-lived peace. Cuba was no Austria, nor a Sudetenland, nor a Congo. It would defend its rights against any encroachments and any dangers, and this the Secretary-General should firmly realise to succeed in his mission or at least to be fully informed of the present state of things.

I expressed full appreciation of the feelings and points of view of Premier Castro. Yet, I wished to come back on the matter of immediate and long-term solutions. The Security Council had only authorised me to find the immediate solution that would give guarantees for peace in this area. I understood that the immediate and long-term solutions are closely linked together, but the latter should be sought in the context of the present situation. I added that I was well aware that it was very difficult in practice to separate the two. I expressed the belief that if an immediate solution was found, it would lead to a permanent solution. As for what Premier Castro had said on Laos and the other countries, I said I agreed with Premier Castro, but I wished to say also that the presence of the U.N. in those countries was meant as a deterrent to aggression from outside, and urged him to consider the possibility that the presence of the U.N. in Cuba for a period of about three weeks would effectively deter aggression. I had the feeling that for the present, and for quite some time to come, one of the U.N.'s major roles in certain countries would be to deter aggression.

President Dorticos joined in Premier Castro's praise of the Secretary General's noble mission, which is to seek the ways to guarantee peace in periods of crisis. He said, however, that the main point was to determine the causes that would precede aggression, whether from the presence of arms in Cuba or from aggressive intentions from the United States. It seemed evident that the danger of war was created by intentions of aggression while the presence of arms in Cuba or elsewhere would not generate a war. Then why was inspection needed to guarantee peace? For that purpose it would be enough if the United States pledged, under U.N. auspices, not to attack Cuba. Thus, as Castro had said, the long-term solution was utterly linked with the short-term solution of the crisis. Premier Castro had said that a U.N. presence in Cuba for inspection purposes was not admissible, but anyway, that would only guarantee a two weeks truce after which the danger would re-appear as long as the condition of danger, namely the U.S. aggressive intentions against Cuba, would remain unaltered. The statement of the five points made by Cuba on October 28 would solve both short and long-term problems, and constitute a basis for peace. The discussion of these five points would not only lead to a long-term solution, but the discussion of the present crisis at the same time would serve as a guarantee for lasting peace. It would do away with the danger of war.

I thanked the President and the Premier, and expressed my agreement with the concept that the solution reached for short-term

4
agreements must lead to negotiations for long-term agreements. But from the point of view of the U.N., and I believe all 110 member states would agree with me, that what was sought by the Security Council, through me, was to provide a way that would help achieve a long-term solution. But as of this moment, the U.N. or the Security Council could agree on a concrete solution for a long-term peace. It would be best for the three powers and for the world community if a long-term solution was found, but I believed it was difficult for the U.N. to achieve this now.

Premier Castro : it seemed clear that if the short-term solution the Secretary-General mentioned would not be obtained, it would be simply because the U.S. did not want it and insisted on asking for inspection only to humiliate Cuba. They asked for a unilateral security; it should suffice that the U.S.S.R. decided to withdraw strategic arms which had been brought here for the defence of the Cuban Republic. The Cuban Government had raised no obstacles to withdrawal of those arms. The decision of the U.S.S.R. was one which was stated publicly and had its wide repercussions in world public opinion. The United States knew full well that the U.S.S.R. had taken this decision in all earnestness and that strategic arms were effectively being withdrawn. If the U.S. wanted something more, it was meant to humiliate Cuba but this they would never achieve. Cuba could not accept impositions which were suitable for vanquished countries alone. We never hesitated a minute in our decision to defend our rights and nobody shall ever be able to impose humiliating conditions upon

us because before succeeding they would have to annihilate all of us first.

I referred again to the United States public statement that it had agreed to commit no aggression and that it would guarantee the territorial integrity of Cuba once the missile bases had been dismantled and removed. In my opinion there was no fundamental disagreement. As I had said earlier, the action of the U.N. would infringe the sovereignty of a member state if consent were not granted previously. If in this case Cuba did not agree, then my duty was to report back. It was not my intention to make impositions on Cuba. My duty was to explore the ways and means of finding a peaceful solution without bloodshed. I could only keep in mind what had been said, and return and report to all concerned. I said that I thought the meeting had been most useful, and if Premier Castro agreed, he hoped to meet again with him. In the meantime, I would think of the points raised by the President and the Prime Minister.

Premier Castro: I should like to sum up the situation. We have, referring to inspection of the Soviet vessels by the International Red Cross, pointed out that we were opposed to their inspection in our ports. But if the U.S.S.R. is permitting the international Red Cross to inspect its vessels on high seas, what point was there to have them inspected once more by the same international Red Cross upon arrival in Cuban ports? My other point is this: the Secretary-General seems to focus his attention and ours on the public pledge to be made by the United

12

States at the U.N. not to invade Cuba. To this I should answer the following: first, the United States has no right to invade Cuba. To do so would be a crime. How is one supposed to start negotiations on the basis of a promise not to commit a crime? We certainly would have more confidence in our will to defend ourselves than in words uttered by the United States.

But if, as I understand it from the Secretary-General, the U.N. attaches such a high importance to a public statement made by the United States not to invade Cuba, why does it not attach equal importance to a public statement made by the U.S.S.R. to withdraw strategic arms sent to us for Cuban deference? We have before us two public statements, two pledges, why is it that the pledge of the United States does not call for additional guarantees while the identical pledge from the U.S.S.R. should call for additional guarantees for inspection?

Allow me to add that we are ready to meet you whenever you wish. Your time will be our time.

I answered to clarify the first point, saying that when the U.S.S.R. stated that it was prepared to agree to Red Cross inspection on the high seas, the Secretary-General informed the Red Cross of this, and they answered that they would do so but that the acceptance of that role was only tentative. The Red Cross has a Governing Body which must meet and discuss this matter. What the Red Cross did say was that verification would be easier for them

at the port of landing of the Soviet vessels. It was a tentative suggestion and not a final one. I concluded by stating that I was very glad to have had this meeting. Then I suggested that another meeting should take place at 10 A.M. the next morning and I would like to be present there without my colleagues, for a more free and frank exchange of views.

It was agreed.

3821

~~CONFIDENTIAL Attachment~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
October 30, 1962

Held

FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: William H. Brubeck *W. H. Brubeck*
Executive Secretary

INR Paper: Kuznetsov's Verification
Proposals Versus Previous Disarmament
Control Provisions, October 30, 1962

Attached is an INR Document which
may be of use to the Executive
Committee.

Attachment:

As stated.
13 Copies.

~~CONFIDENTIAL Attachment~~